In 415-413 BCE, the Siege of Syracuse was fought between the Athenians under Nicias against the Syracusans under Gylippus during the Peloponnesian War.
Why did it happen?
The Peloponnesian War began in 431 BCE when Corinth appealed to Sparta to curb the growing power of Athens, whose power had grown dramatically after the Greco-Persian Wars, effectively becoming a fully-fledged empire by 460 BCE. At first, neither side could gain a decisive advantage, with Sparta superior on land and Athens dominant at sea. Although a truce was declared in 421 BCE, skirmishing between Athens and Sparta continued with a large-scale battle at Mantinea in 418 BCE. In July 415 BCE, Athens decided to send a large expedition to Sicily to aid its ally, Segesta, and conquer the island in preparation for potential expansion in the western Mediterranean. It comprised three ill-assorted generals: Nicias, Lamarchus, and Alcibiades. However, once the fleet had set sail, Alcibiades was accused of profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries and fled to Sparta to escape trial, while Nicias and Lamarchus failed to attract support from the Greek cities in southern Italy. This allowed Syracuse time to prepare its defences and call upon its allies for assistance.
Who was involved?
The Athenian army at Syracuse numbered 9,000 infantry, 500 archers, and 134 warships. Despite having a large army and navy, the Athenians were, in the words of Thucydides, “for the most part ignorant of the size of the island and of the numbers of its inhabitants, both Hellenic and native, and they did not realize that they were taking on a war of almost the same magnitude as their war against the Peloponnesians” (Thuc. 6.1). In addition, there was division in command with Lamarchus arguing for a direct assault while Nicias favoured a blockade. Because the Athenian army had no siege engines, Nicias won the day, and the Athenian plan was to surround Syracuse with a long wall to cut off the city from supplies and starve its inhabitants into surrender. The Syracusan army numbered 3,000 infantry, 1,200 cavalry and 100 warships. Although they were outnumbered and largely untrained initially, the Spartan commander Gylippus eventually revitalized their army by training it along Spartan lines, raising their morale and giving them the will to win.
What happened?
Upon arriving in Sicily, the Athenians built a wall around Syracuse on its landward side to starve the defenders into surrender. Before the Athenians could complete the wall, Gylippus arrived from Sparta in 414 BCE with reinforcements to aid the people of Syracuse. He built two counter walls to block the Athenians from enclosing the city. By 413 BCE, despite the arrival of reinforcements from Athens under Demosthenes, the Athenians became blockaded inside the Syracusan harbour while disease ravaged their ranks. On 9 September 413 BCE, the Athenian navy attempted a breakout of the Syracusan harbour. In the ensuing naval battle, 50 Athenian warships were sunk, while the Syracusan fleet lost only 20 warships. Two days later, on 11 September, the Athenians abandoned the siege and attempted to escape overland. Caught in the mountainous terrain of Sicily under constant harassment from Syracusan cavalry and light infantry, the remaining 7,000 Athenian soldiers surrendered.
What changed as a result?
The Siege of Syracuse was a decisive Syracusan victory. In the aftermath of the siege, the surviving Athenian soldiers were sent to work in the stone quarries of Sicily while Gylippus executed Nicias and Demosthenes. The defeat at Syracuse was a disaster that Athens never recovered from. Over the next eight years, Athens suffered several naval defeats that culminated in the Battle of Aegospotami in 405 BCE. In March 404 BCE, Athens finally surrendered, and the Spartans took over the city and installed an oligarchic government known as the Thirty Tyrants. Although democracy was eventually re-established, Athens never recovered the military and cultural glory that it had held during the fifth century BCE. As stated by Geoffrey Regan, “It was the end of Athenian military hegemony in the Greek world, and marked the failure of the Greeks to establish their dominion over the states of the western Mediterranean” (Regan, 2002, p.16). Had Athens succeeded in conquering Sicily and the states in Italy and North Africa, it is unlikely that the Romans would have emerged as the dominant Mediterranean power in the late third century BCE.
Bibliography
Grant, R.G. Battle: A Visual Journey Through 5,000 Years of Combat. London, Dorling Kindersley, 2005.
Grant, R.G. Battle At Sea: 3,000 Years of Naval Warfare. New York, Dorling Kindersley, 2008.
Regan, Geoffrey. Battles That Changed History: Fifty Decisive Battles Spanning Over 2,500 Years of Warfare. London, Andre Deutsch, 2002.
Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War. Translated by Rex Warner. Harmondsworth, Penguin Classics, 1972.